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Abstract 
The automotive sector must meet strict regulations to increase mobility while reducing 
emissions to demonstrate environmental stewardship. Trust in the promise of a sustainable 
Fahrvergnügen was broken with recent scandals like Dieselgate denting the confidence of 
regulators and consumers. Overpromising on sustainable innovative technology resulted in 
unethical behaviour, deceit, and failure to meet promised standards. We consider to what extent 
societal disapproval was evident in the stock market reaction to these events.  
We sampled 41 announcements (1984 to 2016) and observed a mean stock market reaction of 
-1.01%. There was no difference in the stock reaction in firms failing governmental vs. 
voluntary standards and more negative reactions for events following Dieselgate or when 
compensation was offered. The severity of the reaction to unethical misuse of environmental 
credentials should encourage maintaining promised environmental performances as a 
macromarketing strategy.  
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Introduction  
Firms are increasingly focusing on the environmental credentials of the products that they 
produce and sell. Using eco-labels and assurances of environmental standards supports greater 
margins and the improvement of their business. The use of eco-labels has long been a topic of 
interest, with research focused on whether eco-labels increase demand for products (Sammer 
and Wüstenhagen 2006; Testa et al. 2015), whether they generate price premiums (Blomquist, 
Bartolino, and Waldo 2015; Carlson and Palmer 2016), and their connection to sustainable 
supply chain management (Darnall, Jolley, and Handfield 2008; Iles 2007). Such labels are 
“the result of a long interplay between consumers, markets, and public policy” (Kolodinsky 
2012, p. 203), representing the interest of many societal groups in the transfer of information 
to consumers.  
Competing pressures mean that reaching the environmental standards that are set for 
products is not always a simple matter. As an example, consider the increasing requirements 
in the automotive sector; driven by public interest, many firms have struggled to balance market 
pricing with technological innovation. The increasing and stringent international 
environmental limits should have raised early concerns that there was no technological 
approach available that could feasibly and simultaneously balance regulatory compliance 
requirements against improved customer expectations (Beene 2015; Smith and Parloff 2016).  
Volkswagen (VW) used illegal means to hide the fact that their vehicles did not meet 
emission levels required by the Clean Air Act; this September 2015 event has been dubbed 
“Dieselgate” (Nunes and Park 2016). Emissions were 40 times over the allowed EU-limits 
under non-lab environments, demonstrating the convergence of a failure of governmental 
regulations, the technological challenge of industry developments to meet standards, and 
expectations of consumers (Smith and Parloff 2016). There are some arguments that the limits 
to technology means that meeting the standard is infeasible. However, a test conducted by the 
This is the post-print (i.e., the authors’ final draft, post-refereeing) of the article:  
Wood, L. C., Wang, J. X., Duong, L. N. K., Reiners, T., & Smith, R. (2018). Stock market reactions to auto manufacturers’ 
environmental failures. Journal of Macromarketing, 38(4), 364–382. https://doi.org/10.1177/0276146718781915 
Page 3 
 
International Council on Clean Transportation showed that the technology is available and in 
use in vehicles produced by a VW-competitor (ICCT 2015). For VW’s vehicles, the 
discrepancy between real-time performance and the mandated standard was significant, and 
the firm opted for an institutional decision to deceive until it was exposed by the EPA (US EPA 
2016a). The failure of VW to reach such standards, whether mandated by regulators or 
voluntarily adopted for promotional or competitive purposes, represents an interesting ethical 
problem where misleading marketing practices were employed that had an immediate benefit 
to the firm but a long-term detriment to the environment and society. How should marketers 
respond to these increasing demands for environmental products and what are the implications 
of getting it wrong? 
For a single firm engaged in deceptive or misleading marketing behaviours, there can 
be clear consequences. Regulatory requirements may be changed or updated, or there may be 
penalties levied. The effect of regulatory changes on firms and the study of such consequences 
for firms are a micromarketing study. In the automotive sector, such consequences may be 
relatively moderate or light for the firm, leading many firms to breach requirements repeatedly 
as the immediate cost of doing so may be light while they can ignore the environmental and 
social costs. For example, it has been recognised that when fuel economy standards (e.g., 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards) become too stringent, automakers 
willingly violate standards and pass the penalty costs to consumers (Shiau, Michalek, and 
Hendrickson 2009). Regulation, through the levying of penalties, is a mechanism to provide a 
voice to other groups in society that are not a party to the transaction (Mittelstaedt, Kilbourne, 
and Mittelstaedt 2006). What if there were another immediate and inescapable consequence of 
these behaviours for the firm? This study investigates the consequences of failures to reach 
environmental standards with the consideration of the wider market turned towards the firm, 
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answering the question for macromarketers, “[h]ow do we best measure consequences?” 
(Mittelstaedt, Kilbourne, and Mittelstaedt 2006, p. 136). 
This study addresses two macromarketing issues. First, environmental standards 
encourage firms to adhere to requirements, acting as a mechanism to market firms’ 
environmental conduct towards society as a macromarketing concept. Effective use of such 
environmental standards simultaneously provides economic benefits for firms and 
environmental benefits to society. Misleading marketing that asserts a product reaches an 
environmental standard provides a firm an economic benefit while under-delivering on the 
promised benefits to society.  
Second, the study addresses the measure of consequences for the firm engaging in 
misleading marketing practices as they build a sustainable market orientation (Mitchell, 
Wooliscroft, and Higham 2010). Societal disapproval can be fickle with such reactions as 
boycotts often being ineffective (Diermeier 2012). As a measure of consequence, we take an 
immediate and broad market evaluation using the event study method of evaluating the effects 
of an announcement of misleading marketing. The measure is the wider stock market reaction, 
reflective of the requirements and needs of society, examining the future costs and benefits for 
the firm as a consequence of this event. Our study focuses attention on how society, as 
shareholders and investors, perceive these events. In this way, our study represents an 
important feedback loop for firms engaged in such behaviours as they engage with society and 
develop a stronger sustainability market orientation (Mitchell, Wooliscroft, and Higham 2010). 
As misleading practices fail to deliver to society and our use of the stock market reaction as a 
form of feedback to the firm, this study adds to the macromarketing literature. 
This study is important as it provides evidence of a systematic stock market reaction to 
the announcement of misleading marketing practices as applied to environmental standards. In 
this way, it provides evidence of a strong response and highlights the negativity with which 
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such events are perceived and indicates a strong negative market response can be costly for the 
firms involved. Using an event study methodology, with a sample of 41 negative environmental 
events in the automotive industry, we find there is a negative abnormal return for firms on the 
announcement day. As it is a common notion that reductions in stock prices have some 
deterrence effect on firms (Laplante and Lanoie 1994), this reaction provides a deterrent to 
firms to avoid failing such standards and an incentive to ensure that they meet or even exceed 
the environmental standards.  
The rest of this report is structured as follows. Next, we provide an overview of eco-
labels, explain why environmental standards are attractive to firms, and what happens when 
standards are failed. Hypotheses are developed, with reference to the automotive sector. Then, 
we explain the methodology used, including the collection of our sample, the evaluation of 
themes and the type of analysis used. The calculation of abnormal returns is discussed before 
the results are presented and explained. We conclude with a discussion and reflection on future 
research opportunities.  
Literature Summary  
In this section, we first undertake a literature review of the key concepts relating to 
environmental performance with a focus on a comparison of government-mandated and 
voluntary-environmental standards. Second, we examine environmental standards and 
behaviours in the automotive sector. Third, we develop the key hypotheses we test in 
subsequent sections. 
Product-harm, Safety Recalls, and Government-Mandated Environmental 
Standards 
There is an expansive body of literature on product-harm, and the resulting product recalls to 
ensure consumer safety; a comprehensive review is provided by Wowak and Boone (2015). 
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Recalls can be voluntary or mandated, with the mandated recalls focused on public safety; 
mandated recalls are more hazardous to firms, suggesting that firms are more likely to confess 
and be proactive about smaller safety violations (Rupp and Taylor 2002). The issues of product-
harm and the management of product safety lie at the heart of the macromarketing focus on the 
impact of marketing systems on society and the impact of society back on the marketing 
systems (Hunt 1981). The issue stems from the disruptive event where a gap is identified 
between firm outcomes regarding product safety and the societal or mandated expectation. 
Actions required by a firm to close the gap result in operational or financial investments borne 
by the firm to remain compliant. 
Failing to meet safety standards spans research on a diverse range of industries (e.g., 
food safety culture or patient safety culture) where companies commit to stringent standards as 
errors lead to serious public safety issues. The food industry is very competitive, and food 
safety and quality is often used as a selling point (Grunert 2005); for example, food companies 
use nutrition labels (e.g., low-fat product claims) to influence the dietary behaviour of 
consumer (e.g., overweight and obese) (Pennings, Striano, and Oliverio 2014). Effective use 
of labels requires the commitment from companies’ managers to adhere to standards (Griffith, 
Livesey, and Clayton 2010; Powell, Jacob, and Chapman 2011). Significant efforts are made 
in healthcare to reduce medical errors and improve patient safety. McFadden, Henagan, and 
Gowen (2009) used national data from over 200 hospitals and provided empirical evidence that 
leadership style is directly related to the patient safety culture. The results provide empirical 
support that hospitals need to focus on the leadership style to improve patient safety. Similarly, 
in the automotive industry, corporate leadership in the health, safety, and environmental 
standards area has shown to be important, where the attitudes of managers and their decisions 
are vital to product safety (Lutz, Lyon, and Maxwell 2000). 
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Several recent issues within the automotive sector stand out as being relevant to the 
wider implications of safety issues (Suhanyiova, Flin, and Irwin 2016): the Takata airbag 
inquiry in 2015, the recalls relating to the airbags, and Toyota’s high accident rate due to 
accelerators becoming stuck on incompatible floor mats in 2009.  
The faulty airbag manufacturer, Takata, should have been aware as early as 2001 of 
quality issues that could consequently affect the health and well-being of consumers; the first 
notifications of accidents were received in 2007, and the first recall occurred in 2008 
(Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation 2015). The sluggish response appears 
to be a deliberate effort to ignore the issue, as indicated by “internal emails obtained by the 
Committee suggest that Takata may have prioritized profit over safety by halting global safety 
audits for financial reasons” (Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation 2015, p. 
1).  
In contrast, the quality problems experienced by Toyota resulted in intense public 
scrutiny. First, there was the minor floor-mat recall (2007), a fatal highway accident (2009), a 
major Toyota recall (2011) and the release of a U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) report in 2011; these resulted in non-significant stock market 
reaction reactions (on the day of the event) of -0.77%, 0.5%, -0.6%, and a significant + 3.74% 
(Gokhale, Brooks, and Tremblay 2014). The investigation by the NHTSA found that there were 
“no electronic flaws in Toyota vehicles capable of [creating the] dangerous high-speed 
unintended acceleration incidents” (NHTSA 2016, para. 3). While there appears to have been 
no intent to deceive, the Chairman acknowledged his “fear the pace at which we have grown 
may have been too quick” (Reuters 2010, para. 5), suggesting that culture and employee 
capability may not have shifted at the same rate as volume growth. Later suggestions were that 
Toyota had “misled U.S. consumers by concealing and making deceptive statements about two 
safety issues affecting its vehicles” (Department of Justice 2014, para. 2). In both these cases, 
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there appear to be deliberate institutional decisions to deceive. The failures have resulted in 
costs to the firm to address the issue (e.g., through recalls or compensation) and societal 
disapproval.  
The failure to meet safety standards is similar to failures to meet mandated 
environmental standards. First, there will be costs to the firm of addressing the issue to ensure 
products reach the mandated environmental standard. When a mandated safety standard is not 
met, the firm will suffer direct costs, such as managing the recall, loss of reputation and future 
sales, reimbursements to customers, or logistics costs association with product returns, or a 
penalty to the government (Berman 1999), in particular in the automotive industry (Souiden 
and Pons 2009). An example of the firm-level impact is the case where Ford Explorers 
sometimes rolled following a blow out of their Firestone Tyres; the estimated recall cost to 
Firestone was around $750 million, not including any liability associated with lawsuits (Bates 
et al. 2007). 
Second, there are the long-term consequences to societal views of such misleading 
marketing, making this a clear macromarketing issue. In the case of Opel, vehicles were tested 
to meet government-mandated standards and were found to be legal – that is, within the 
regulations for the laboratory test. The setup of the software for emissions control demonstrated 
a lack of social responsibility, as they were selected to pass laboratory tests rather than meet 
customer requirements in actual use (Blanco 2016). The failure to meet these requirements 
resulted in emissions 40 times greater than the limits (Smith and Parloff 2016), posing health 
consequences to society and non-users of the vehicles. 
There are parallels between the research on product-harm and the failure to reach safety 
standards and the focus of this research on the failure to reach environmental standards. 
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Voluntary Environmental Standards, Competitiveness, and Prices 
Eco-labelling and marketing using voluntary environmental standards inform consumers about 
products’ characteristics and environmental attributes (de Boer 2003; Bratt et al. 2011; Delmas 
and Grant 2014). From a firm’s perspective, eco-labels communicate the superior 
environmental performance of a product compared to non-labelled products, differentiating the 
product and creating a competitive advantage (de Boer 2003; Bratt et al. 2011; Brécard et al. 
2009). Eco-labels enable access to information about a product’s environmental pedigree, 
revealing the more sustainable players in the market (de Boer 2003; Brécard et al. 2009; 
Delmas and Grant 2014; Harbaugh, Maxwell, and Roussillon 2011). Firms can capitalise on 
the increased demand for environmentally friendly goods (Brécard et al. 2009; Delmas and 
Grant 2014). There is evidence that eco-labels influence consumers’ green consumption and 
can guide consumer purchasing decisions (Horne 2009; Sammer and Wüstenhagen 2006; Testa 
et al. 2015), and steer both consumers and producers in a more sustainable direction (Bratt et 
al. 2011).  
Consumer awareness through more information and education about eco-labels has 
been cited as a way to improve adoption (Harbaugh, Maxwell, and Roussillon 2011; Madurah, 
Reiners, and Wood 2016). Behavioural approaches should be used, such as making 
sustainability issues feel important to consumers (Grolleau et al. 2016). Horne (2009) criticises 
label simplicity as a solution and found it does not ease inter-product comparisons and 
undermines label efficacy. These findings are relevant to macromarketing theory, as it has been 
noted that economists prefer the use of regulations or schemes to remedy the costs or benefits 
of externalities (Mittelstaedt, Kilbourne, and Mittelstaedt 2006). Such solutions aim to reignite 
the role of eco-labels and ensure they enable consumers to make informed decisions and firms 
to reap the benefits of sustainable operations.  
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The adoption of stringent standards can promote competitiveness. The voluntary use of 
a standard stricter than a mandated standard (and advertised using an eco-label) can bring price 
premiums or market differentiation (Blomquist, Bartolino, and Waldo 2015; Roheim, Asche, 
and Santos 2011). The adoption of a standard mandated elsewhere in the world that is stricter 
than that mandated in the current market can also present a competitive advantage in the 
market; e.g., the adoption of the stricter standards in the U.S. automotive market can influence 
improved products design in China (Zhu, Sarkis, and Lai 2007). These relationships indicate 
that as societal expectations increase, there is an increasingly professional and moral 
responsibility for managers to support organizational activities to meet these expectations 
(Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. The relationship of voluntary standards to mandated standards and the relationship to higher levels of 
professional responsibility required to ensure the standards are met. Adapted from Figure 3 in Laczniak and Murphy 
(2006). 
Marketers have considered certifications or eco-labels as marketing gimmicks 
(Atkinson and Rosenthal 2014) that may be costly to implement and have focused on 
measuring the benefits to the firm of voluntarily implementing such standards, labels, or 
certifications (Mittelstaedt, Kilbourne, and Mittelstaedt 2006). While there is some evidence 
for price premiums (Blomquist, Bartolino, and Waldo 2015; Roheim, Asche, and Santos 2011), 
others find limited evidence (Carlson and Palmer 2016). There are mixed perspectives on the 
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benefits of ISO14001 (environmental standards) certification; while certification improves 
both long-term financial and operational performance (Treacy 2015), it may decrease the short-
term financial performance (Cañón-de-Francia and Garcés-Ayerbe 2009; Paulraj and de Jong 
2011). As the financial benefits of certification are uncertain, voluntary adoption of 
certification can be seen as providing parity rather than an advantage in a competitive 
marketplace (Paulraj and de Jong 2011). Internationalised firms and those that are more 
polluting face even greater negative financial performance from certification (Cañón-de-
Francia and Garcés-Ayerbe 2009). 
The use of voluntarily setting a higher environmental standard for the firm and being 
found to be non-compliant may have a similar impact to being non-compliant with safety 
regulations or mandated environmental performance. The firm, wishing to close the gap, may 
attempt to remedy the situation and resolve the issue, facing operational disruptions and costs 
of changing products or processes, with the expectation that after incurring these costs their 
revenue should at least be maintained. When there is public recognition of a gap between 
voluntarily set standard and actual performance, it can be challenging for a firm to close the 
gap. 
Overall, the marketing use of voluntarily adopted eco-labels and environmental 
standards can enable a firm to leverage the environmental performance of their product and 
enhance their competitiveness and financial performance. 
 
Fuel Economy Standards in the Automotive Sector 
Little research has examined how firms are affected if they fail to meet the environmental 
standards that they claim to meet, or that are required by government mandate. Our research 
has focused on the impact of avoiding bad in corporate social responsibility and surrounding 
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areas; this contrasts with most research that instead examines the benefits from doing good 
(Lin-Hi and Müller 2013). Downing and Kimball (1982) noted that it was rare for violations 
of pollution control laws, such as emissions standards, to result in a court action or other 
punitive measures. Instead, many violations are resolved non-judicially, which is evident in the 
number of voluntary or forced recalls undertaken when auto manufacturers fail to meet 
emission standards; as the EPA has the authority to require a manufacturer to issue a recall of 
vehicles that do not conform to regulations (US EPA 2016a). The negative publicity that occurs 
from refusing such a request from the EPA is substantial enough to ensure compliance (Jackson 
and Morgan 1988). Levy and Levenson (1979, as cited in Jackson and Morgan 1988) reported 
that at least 75% of vehicles repaired under EPA guidance are recalled voluntarily, and only 
25% of recalls were EPA-ordered. Barber and Darrough (1996) determined that recalls 
negatively affect firms’ shareholder value; the impact is exacerbated for more reputable firms 
(Rhee and Haunschild 2006); such studies focused on recalls in general rather than those related 
to a failure to meet environmental standards. 
A deterioration in reputation is not the only challenge facing a firm from failing to fulfil 
the claims on an eco-label. Some of the firms identified to be performing below certification 
standards were subsequently de-certified or had their certifications suspended until they 
improved their performance (Christian et al. 2013; Froese and Proelss 2012; Gutierrez et al. 
2012). Loss of certification has further disadvantages and can cause firms to be excluded from 
vital markets that only trade with certified firms (Lallemand et al. 2016); retaining certification 
is, therefore, critical for holding the market position. Access to markets is the main motivator 
for getting certified (Hadjimichael and Hegland 2016) and should provide incentives to firms 
to avoid failing to meet standards.  
A remedy may be provided to consumers when a firm fails to reach a level of 
performance such as safety standards or environmental credentials as in this study; remedies 
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are measures that reflect the firms’ strategic choices to meet varying incentives and goals (Liu, 
Liu, and Luo 2016). Refunds (i.e., monetary compensation), repairs, and extended warranties 
are the three major remedies for environmental failures adopted by the automotive sector.  
First, monetary compensation indicates a cash reimbursement to the misled consumers. 
For example, Mitsubishi Motors offered compensation of about $1,000 USD to consumers 
affected by overstated mileage claims with the value relating to extra gas costs and reduced 
resale value of the vehicles (Shiraki and Tajitsu 2016). Interestingly, in the case of Dieselgate, 
Volkswagen claimed the hidden ‘defeat devices’ (that detect when the vehicle is being tested 
and improves the results) would not affect the value of the vehicles and refused to compensate 
European consumers (Hausfeld 2016).  
Second, free repairs can also act as a remedy for owners of affected vehicles. Chrysler 
offered no-cost repairs to consumers when their vehicles were identified as failing to meet U.S. 
Federal emission standards (US Fed News 2005). Third, extended warranties provide 
additional value to consumers at no immediate cost to the firm. General Motors supplemented 
consumers’ existing factory warranty with a 48-month/60,000-mile service protection plan as 
compensation for the overstated fuel economy (Spector 2016). These remedies vary regarding 
financial obligations for firms and the level of consumer satisfaction they provide. 
Hypotheses 
We now develop our hypotheses, based on the review of the literature. 
The stock market reaction to a failure announcement. The automotive industry has one of the 
largest impacts on the environment and, therefore, plays an important role in the sustainable 
development of society and the reducing of emissions (Günther, Kannegiesser, and Autenrieb 
2015; Koplin, Seuring, and Mesterharm 2007). Much of the literature on sustainability and the 
automotive industry looks at the effects of regulations and manufacturers’ ability to meet them. 
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Government regulations and policies, such as the 1977 Clean Air Act (CAA), can force car 
manufacturers to conduct sustainable innovation and adopt more sustainable technologies 
(Gerard and Lave 2005). Technological policies and institutions like the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) provide pressure that leads to significant technological advances and 
environmental improvements by firms (Gerard and Lave 2005) and are among those external 
forces that influence firms’ adoption of more sustainable practices (Hall 2000; Seuring and 
Müller 2008). 
As a part of the CAA emissions certification programme, every passenger car or light 
truck sold in the U.S. has a government fuel economy rating sticker aimed at providing 
consumers with reliable information they can use to compare vehicles (Greene et al. 2017). 
These ratings can differ greatly from the estimated amount, and in reality, cars have a much 
lower fuel economy (Greene et al. 2006, 2017; Mintz, Vyas, and Conley 1993), with 
automotive fuel economy tests understating fuel use by 15-25% (Schipper and Tax 1994). 
Greene et al. (2006, 2017) find this estimation gap particularly large for hybrid vehicles, which 
is concerning considering the advertising for hybrids is built around them being more 
sustainable and economical. Wernle and Nelson (2014) iterate this in regards to Ford having to 
lower their fuel economy ratings for a number of their hybrid vehicles and how such actions 
undercut their advertising, which revolves around fuel economy. Similarly to the way the 
collective reputation of an eco-label or certification body can be harmed when a single firm 
fails it (Hamilton and Zilberman 2006), the variation in estimates, “reduces the value of fuel 
economy information by diminishing confidence in the accuracy of the fuel economy ratings” 
(Greene et al. 2017, p. 158).  
While fuel economy tests are useful for indicating the relative difference in efficiency 
of new cars, the tests themselves are a poor measure of actual fuel usage (Schipper and Tax 
1994). This is due to factors such as driver behaviour, the testing formulae under-representing 
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real-life driving situations, and test values not representing the cars sold, i.e., through 
optimisation of the tested vehicle (Schipper and Tax 1994). The last point raises a matter of 
interest; do car manufacturers knowingly manipulate emissions tests to get favourable ratings? 
Alternatively, are the variations purely down to reasons beyond the manufacturers’ control, 
such as how people drive the car?  
The issue of fraudulent emission reporting is evident in the automotive industry with 
automakers misreporting their emission levels. The most significant example has been dubbed 
Dieselgate, where VW was publicly vilified when it was discovered their vehicles were not 
only emitting far more toxic fumes than legally allowed but that they were aware of it and were 
actively covering it up (Nunes and Park 2016; Siano et al. 2017). Earlier, both Honda and Ford 
were involved in a similar situation when they were fined by the U.S. government for tampering 
with emission control devices that caused emissions to increase beyond regulated levels 
(Mokhiber 1998). Since Dieselgate, U.S. automakers have conducted their own emissions tests, 
and in Europe automakers hire private companies to conduct them (Hakim and Bradsher 2015). 
Hakim and Bradsher (2015) also suggested that private testing companies can find ways to 
obtain the lowest possible emissions levels, and may do so to secure contracts with the 
carmaker.  
Given the economic consequences of this type of event, plus existing studies showing 
that there is a spillover from Dieselgate, we hypothesise that: 
HYPOTHESIS 1. The announcements of failures to meet environmental standards will have a 
negative stock market reaction. 
 
Failing to meet environmental standards. Environmental standards may either be mandatory, 
imposed by governments acting on behalf of their communities, or they may be voluntary, used 
as a marketing device to promote the superior performance of the product.  
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In trying to explain why some firms violated mandated environmental standards when 
others over-comply, Wu (2009) found that firm’s decisions to violate environmental 
regulations were related to the costs and risks of implementing sustainable practices, along 
with market forces, facility characteristics, and managerial values. The failure to meet 
mandated standards results in penalties. For instance, in the U.S. all vehicle and engine 
emissions are required by the CAA to meet certain pollution standards, and all new vehicles 
are required by CAFE to meet certain fuel economy standards enforced by either the EPA or 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) (Shiau, Michalek, and 
Hendrickson 2009). All new vehicles and engines are also required to have EPA-issued 
certificates of conformity and emissions labels (US EPA 2017). The EPA may seek civil 
penalties for violations of the CAA, which can be taken through the courts, and violators can 
be subject to fines of up to US$37,500 per noncompliant vehicle or per day for violations in 
reporting, as well as fines of up to US$3,750 per tampering event or sale of a defect device (US 
EPA 2016b). The NHTSA also issues fines for violations of CAFE standards, which have been 
set at US$55 per mpg per vehicle (Shiau, Michalek, and Hendrickson 2009). One example in 
this group is DaimlerChrysler, required to pay a penalty of US$1m and spend US$94m 
improving their emission controls after they were found to be violating the CAA (US EPA 
2005), showing there can be an immediate and well-determined financial penalty in the case of 
failing to meet environmental standards. 
Other firms claim to meet a voluntary standard in excess of the mandated standard, 
using eco-label or branding to tout the environmental superiority of their products relative to 
the competition. This voluntary over-compliance occurs when firms claim to operate at a level 
above the legal environmental standards (Kirchhoff 2000). Over-compliance and the 
connotations associated with this attract a subset of customers that highly value this feature and 
can provide a significant market advantage and increased legitimacy (Guo et al. 2017). 
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Strategic use of an environmental orientation leads to improved competitiveness 
(Leonidou et al. 2017) and improved financial performance (Leonidou, Christodoulides, and 
Thwaites 2016). The general pattern holds true for manufacturing firms, where superior 
environmental performance in manufacturing (Koo, Chung, and Ryoo 2014) or logistics (Rao 
and Holt 2005) leads to improved economic outcomes.  
When a firm fails to meet their promoted voluntary standard, it attracts media 
vilification. The process is sometimes referred to as greenwashing, where firms promote 
themselves as sustainable or green and yet their products’ performance fails to meet the 
promoted levels (Delmas and Burbano 2011). They have claimed that they are operating at a 
higher environmental standard than regular firms, and as such when their actual operations do 
not reflect these claims, they are publicly sanctioned. An example was a consumer report that 
asserted two Ford hybrid vehicles fell short of their claimed fuel economy that was promoted 
as superior to the competition (Harlin 2012).  
Greenwashing is associated with negative abnormal returns; those with poorer 
environmental performance suffer worse outcomes (Du 2015). When failure to attain the 
desired standards is revealed, there are adverse implications for the firms affected as 
“organizations discovered using questionable tactics may suffer dire consequences [such as 
the] loss of reputation, consumer trust and corresponding market share” and that “the 
repercussions of greenwashing could be long lasting” (Mitchell and Ramey 2011, p. 43). As 
the public notification of greenwashing leads to reduced competitiveness and economic returns 
for the firm, damages their reputation and lowers legitimacy with the passionate market niche, 
this can have further spill-over effects on the brand itself. The stock market reaction 
encapsulates an overall judgement of the uncertain impact of greenwashing on the legitimacy 
of the brand, the reputation, consumer trust, and market share; in contrast to a more certain 
penalty (for violating a mandated standard), failing to meet a voluntary standard involves 
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greater long-term risk. Risk-averse investors are more likely to respond with a stronger 
negative reaction that reflects the detrimental effect of the failure on the firm. 
The failure of a firm to reach a self-imposed standard, higher than the minimum, 
government mandated level, can cause a loss of competitive advantage in the marketplace. We 
hypothesise that failure to meet a stringent and self-imposed standard will be treated more 
negatively by investors than the failure to meet required standards, and, therefore: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: The stock market reaction to announcements of failures to meet voluntary 
fuel standards will be more negative than failure to meet mandated standards. 
 
The impact of a refund as a remedy. Where the environmental failure occurred due to 
mechanical defect rather than any deliberate intent, firms can protect their reputation with 
proactive, voluntary recalls to avoid negative publicity (Jackson and Morgan 1988). Thus, it is 
of interest to determine how firms respond to accusations that they have failed environmental 
standards, whether deliberate or not. While some firms admit that they have violated 
regulations and settle any accusations or lawsuits without argument, others deny the allegations 
but still settle. An example was Nissan, accused of manipulating emission tests by the Korean 
government and ordered to recall certain vehicles and pay a US$280,000 fine (Nam 2016). 
Nissan denied the accusation but in the wake of Dieselgate, agreed to recall the vehicles. Other 
firms deny accusations and fight any legal action against them until a conclusion, positive or 
negative, is reached (e.g., SsangYong Motor Company refrained from compensation due to 
overstating fuel efficiency until after the court verdict (Nam 2014)). Although a firm’s reaction 
to such allegations does not prove their ethical or unethical behaviour, it gives an indication of 
their defensive nature or sensitivity to such issues (Laczniak and Murphy 2006). The offer of 
a refund can be perceived as an admission of further or deeper issues and a perceived liability. 
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In the case of product recalls, there are greater financial consequences of issuing a 
refund than other remediation measures (Liu, Liu, and Luo 2016; Ni, Flynn, and Jacobs 2014) 
and the direct costs to the firm may be higher than using other remedies (Berman 1999). When 
a firm fails to reach environmental standards, a refund may be preferred by customers if they 
see the cause of the problem as relatively permanent and unlikely to change (Folkes 1984), 
while the refund may be seen by investors as the higher cost option.  
As a refund may indicate other, deeper problems and that there may be more to the 
issue than is admitted, coupled with the greater financial costs of offering a refund, we 
hypothesise: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: The stock market reaction to offers of refunds will be more negative than 
for other remedies. 
 
The changing perception of the importance of meeting standards. Firms have demanded that 
suppliers adopt more environmentally friendly practices, pushing environmental concern up 
the supply chain in both the automotive sector (González, Sarkis, and Adenso-Díaz 2008; 
Vanalle, Lucato, and Santos 2011) and other sectors (Rogers 2016; Wang, Petkova, and Wood 
2014; Wang and Wood 2016). There has been increasing dissemination of ISO 14001 standards 
through globalized supply chains (Castka and Corbett 2015; Heras-Saizarbitoria and Boiral 
2013; Heras-Saizarbitoria, Boiral, and Allur 2018). 
Sukitsch et al. (2015) note that the automotive industry is aware of the significance of 
corporate sustainability activities, yet the majority of implementation appears to be defensive 
rather than proactive. Firms like Ford have successfully overcome allegations of greenwashing 
and become celebrated for their green practices (Mitchell and Harrison 2012).  
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As a result of the significant growth in firms’ awareness, they have increasingly worked 
to capitalise on the trend towards improved environmental performance (Brécard et al. 2009; 
Delmas and Grant 2014). As this occurs, firms and supply chains improve their performance 
levels to meet requirements. When a problem or failure occurs, investors are likely to perceive 
it as a failure of the firm’s marketing strategy rather than the firm’s inability, which generates 
less societal damage. Given recent improvements in environmental performance (through the 
use of technology), failure to reach the environmental standard is regarded by investors as a 
failure of the macromarketing strategy as firms aspire to economic gains using eco-labels but 
are wary of the costs of achieving the promised environmental performance. Therefore, the 
overall damage to their reputation is smaller compared with that in earlier yearswhen 
performance was lower. This means that the stock market reaction to such infractions will be 
increasingly smaller over time. Therefore, we hypothesise that: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4: The stock market reaction to recent announcements of failures to meet 
environmental standards will be less negative than for older announcements. 
 
The change in reaction following Dieselgate. While, in general, the impact of announced 
failures to meet environmental standards will reduce over time, following Dieselgate, the stock 
market reaction to such news is likely to be more negative. The influence of a large and 
recognised event, such as Dieselgate, can have wider ramifications on the business community. 
Mansouri (2016) identified the reasons behind Dieselgate, examined the impact on VW 
stakeholders and how such an event should be dealt with, and how it can be prevented from 
happening again. Dieselgate illustrated the trade-off between controlling vehicle emissions 
under regulation and improving vehicle performance to meet consumer demand (Klier and 
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Linn 2016). Cârstea (2016) faults consumers for wanting high-performance cars despite the 
environmental impact these types of vehicles have through excessive pollutants.  
One of the largest consequences of the scandal was the loss of consumer confidence in 
car manufacturers that affected not only VW but the entire automotive industry (Cârstea 2016). 
Lack of consumer faith in VW caused loyal customers to switch brands, and VW sales fell 
dramatically (Mansouri 2016). Shareholders also lost confidence, and VW’s shares plunged, 
wiping billions of dollars in value from the company (Mansouri 2016). Dieselgate provoked 
discussions on how to reduce the gap between emissions testing and real-world observations, 
and both the U.S. and the E.U. regulators adjusted their evaluation of fuel economy measures 
(Klier and Linn 2016). Investors are risk-averse and volatility increases following an event, 
with a contagion effect on related firms (Brown, Harlow, and Tinic 1988). Due to the risk-
averse nature of investors and the way they treat related firms, in this case the competitors of 
VW, we expect systematic changes following a watershed event like Dieselgate where 
investors may take a more punitive approach to offenders that fail to meet environmental 
standards. 
Given the change in consumption patterns and increasing regulatory attention, it is clear 
that investors, regulators, and society react to the highly publicised circumstances of the 
offending firm and their competitors after a watershed event. With the close attention and the 
risk-averse nature of investors, there will be an increased stock market reaction to failures to 
meet standards following Dielsegate. Therefore, we hypothesise that: 
HYPOTHESIS 5: The stock market reaction to announcements of failures to meet 
environmental standards after Dieselgate will be more negative than other announcements. 
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Methodology  
Sample Selection and Description 
The sample in this study consists of announcements made about firms in the automotive 
industry which have failed to meet their environmental commitments. Often these 
announcements are made when the government, or some other party such as the EPA in the 
U.S., discovers certain vehicles violate environmental standards (i.e., with excess emissions), 
when a recall is announced due to emissions flaws, or when a firm has been found to have 
overstated the efficiency/economy claims of their vehicles.  
To generate our sample, we first undertook an initial search with preliminary keywords 
following guidelines in Wood and Wang (2018). As we identified announcements, we 
developed a more comprehensive set of keywords. Through the standard iterative process of 
identifying, evaluating, and adding commonly used keywords in such announcements, a final 
set of keywords was created. The search terms used related to a sequence of synonyms of 
certification for automotive firms (e.g., ecolabel* or certif* or Clean Air Act) within five words 
of a synonym for misrepresentation (e.g., fals* or mislead* or greenwash* or fraud* or 
unsustainab* or misrepresent*) were used to identify relevant events, along with verbs located 
near the keywords to ensure the events were of interest to the study; the broad set of keywords 
limits the possibility of missing any important announcements. These keywords were used to 
search for and download the full text of announcements from the Dow Jones Institutional News, 
Global Newswire (U.S.) and The Wall Street Journal (All sources) for the period 1980-01-01 
to 2016-12-15. 
This search resulted in over 17,000 articles. The articles were scanned for relevance to 
the failure of environmental standards. Of those deemed relevant, the full text was scanned. All 
articles not concerning the environmental performance of automotive manufacturers were 
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excluded, along with multi-event announcements. For example, a firm announcing two 
separate recalls, one due to an environmental failure and the other a safety issue, would be 
excluded as the effect of the environmental failure could not be isolated. To ensure that the first 
announcement was identified, more targeted searches were undertaken on each event, and only 
the earliest announcement was retained (Park, Park, and Zhang 2003).  
The final event sample of 53 was gathered. Any subsequent developments relating to 
the main event were recorded as sub-events, as often the ramifications and coverage of these 
events extended. While these were not included in the research, the event and sub-event sample 
were 136 from 25 different automotive firms (although some belong to the same parent group).  
Two additional checks determined whether there were other confounding events and to 
ensure there were sufficient stock returns data, enabling the event to be considered in further 
analysis. First, a confounding event check on the event sample of 53 cases was used to 
determine whether other financially relevant events also occurred during the event window 
(McWilliams and Siegel 1997; Wood and Wang 2018). Thus, a three-day event window (the 
date before and after the initial announcement) was analysed for each firm, and confounding 
events, if any, were recorded and the event was excluded. Second, we collected the stock 
returns using Datastream. In some instances, a firm was not publicly listed (at the time of the 
event) and was excluded. After checking for and removing cases where there were confounding 
events or no stock returns data, the final sample size was 41 events.  
Estimating Abnormal Returns 
We used the event study methodology to calculate abnormal returns to determine the stock 
market reaction to the failure of firms to meet environmental standards. This is a process for 
evaluating the difference between the return on a given stock (related to the events in our 
sample) relative to an appropriate benchmark. Careful selection of the benchmark enables 
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control for several other factors that might explain changes in the stock returns. After 
controlling for these factors, the remaining unexplained variation is considered to be the 
abnormal return that is connected to other influences – in this case, the influence of the events 
under study. Event study methodology has been used to investigate many significant events 
that are of interest to the stock market and consumers, such as recalls of food (Salin and Hooker 
2001) or toys (Wood et al. 2017), delays in product introductions (Hendricks and Singhal 
2008), and supply chain disruptions (Papadakis 2006). 
Estimation Windows and Time Period When Measuring Abnormal Returns 
The normal return parameters were estimated through an ordinary least squares approach with 
an estimation window of 200 trading days, separated from the event day by a 10-day isolation 
period, resulting in an estimation window of (-211, -11), and this is similar to previous event 
study research (Hendricks, Singhal, and Zhang 2009).  
Model for Estimating Abnormal Returns 
While there are many methods of calculating the abnormal returns, we opted to use the 
commonly used market model as this provides an effective estimate of abnormal returns by 
relating the normal returns to the returns of market portfolio (Brown and Warner 1985; 
MacKinlay 1997). Using the market model, the abnormal return ARit for firm i on day t was 
estimated as: 
    	
   (1) 
where Rit is the return on the stock of firm i on day t. Rmt is the normal return calculated with 
reference to the market portfolio of stocks on day t. 	
and are market model parameters, 
estimated using ordinary least squares. 
Since the final sample firms are listed in different indices from six countries, local 
indices are applied to estimate market movement for individual stocks, as suggested for multi-
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country event studies (Campbell, Cowan, and Salotti 2010; Corrado and Truong 2008; Meric, 
Ratner, and Meric 2008; Samitas, Kenourgios, and Zounis 2008). The selected local indices 
are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Local Market Index and proportion of each sample coming from each country. 
 
Country  Local Index  Sample  % of sample 
Germany  CDAX_GERMANY 6 14.63% 
France SBF_120_FRANCE 1 2.44% 
Japan NIKKEI_225_JAPAN 9 21.95% 
U. S. S&P_500  19 46.34% 
Korea KOREA _SE 5 12.20% 
U. K. FTSE_UK 1 2.44% 
 
Hypothesis Testing and Cross-Sectional Analysis 
We used cross-sectional regression to determine how the impact of the announcement was 
related to the firm and characteristics of the failures in question (Kothari and Warner 2007). 
We used the following regression model: 
         !  "#$%&' 
()$*&+$&  ,&'  -.$+/+0   1 
(2) 
where AbReti,j is the abnormal return for firm i for event j and the control variable Firmi 
controls for the firm-fixed effects of each firm in the sample. 
Variables to represent hypotheses. Whether the failure related to voluntarily high levels of 
performance was addressed with the variable Voluntary. The voluntary status was evaluated 
by examining the announcements to determine how the event was described. The predicted 
sign of the coefficient was negative. 
What compensation method, if any, was used by the firm (Compensation) was 
evaluated by classifying the announced remedy. The primary focus was a classification of 
compensation offered vs. other remedies. The predicted sign of the coefficient was negative. 
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Whether the effects of more recent events were milder than older events (Recency) was 
evaluated by calculating the number of years from the start of the sample (1984) to the year of 
the current event. Therefore, recent events have a higher value. The predicted sign of the 
coefficient was positive. 
The variable for events occurring following Dieselgate (PostDieselgate) was calculated 
by taking the date for Dieselgate and classifying whether the event occurred before or after the 
date. The predicted sign of the coefficient was negative. 
 
Control variables. We used three control variables. First, we controlled for the firm-fixed 
effects in the model for each firm (Firm). Some firm-specific factors may influence reactions 
similarly to recalls announced by a single firm.  
Second, we controlled for the size of the firm (FirmSize). We used the logarithm 
transformation of the net sales or revenues of the firms involved for the year before the 
announcement. The revenue determines whether the size of the firm has any effect on the 
abnormal returns. Larger firms have a greater ability to cover costs associated with an adverse 
event (Jones and Rubin 2001), and thus the abnormal returns may be influenced by the firm 
size. 
Third, we controlled for whether a recall was simultaneously announced (Recall), 
which tests if the involvement of a recall in an announcement affects the observed returns as 
there is strong evidence that recalls have a negative impact on abnormal returns. 
 
Model Diagnostics for Influential Observations and Homoscedasticity  
An analysis of the influence of each observation indicated that no observation was greater than 
three times the average hat-value, which is the point in a smaller sample where there would be 
a concern that the observation was unduly influential (Fox 2002). We also tested for skewness 
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in the data; the departure from a normal distribution has minimal impact on results when using 
the market model to estimate daily stock returns (Brown and Warner 1985). Due to the small 
sample size, we used the studentised Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch and Pagan 1979) which 
indicated a level of heteroscedasticity (13.093, df = 7, p-value = 0.06987). Therefore, we used 
robust standard errors in our analysis (White 1982); specifically, the Heteroscedasticity 
Consistent (HC3) estimator as it provides robust performance with small samples and 
influential observations (Kleiber 2008). 
Results and Discussion 
We found that on the day of an announcement about a failure to meet environmental standards 
(Day 0), there is a mean negative abnormal return of -1.01%, which is statistically different 
from zero at the 5% level with a two-tailed test using the Boehmer et al. adjusted test statistic 
of t-BMP (Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen 1991), the Corrado Rank test (Corrado and 
Zivney 1992), and the Patell Z test (Patell 1976). Table 2 shows the results using two commonly 
used models to calculate the abnormal returns; both models provide consistent results 
indicating no sensitivity to the selection of the model used to calculate abnormal returns. The 
following analysis used the more conservative abnormal returns calculated using the market 
model. Sixty one percent of the firms experienced a negative return. 
Table 2. Abnormal returns for the event day (0) using two common models. 
 
n Mean 
CAR 
Positive: 
Negative 
Cross-
sectional t 
Patell Z t-BMP Corrado 
Rank 
Multi-country Market model  
41 -1.01% 16:25 -2.0131** -4.7246*** -2.5791*** -2.1625** 
Mean adjusted model  
41 -1.16% 18:23 -2.0617** -3.9114*** -2.6757*** -1.8657* 
Significant levels (two-tailed tests): * 10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level  
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These results indicate that an announcement of an environmental failure has a negative 
financial impact on the firm, and firms that fail to meet advertised or assumed environmental 
performance have adverse stock market reactions. To further understand what contributes to 
the abnormal returns found, explanatory variables were regressed against the abnormal returns 
as the dependent variable (Table 3). 
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Table 3. Results of hierarchical regression analysis (n=40; 1 case was excluded due to missing data). 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 
Coefficient Robust 
std Error 
Coefficient Robust std 
Error 
VIF 
Intercept 0.0649* 0.0404 0.0229 0.0464  
Firm -0.0005 0.0015 -0.0007 0.0016 2.31 
Recall 0.0044 0.0144 0.004 0.0129 2.76 
FirmSize -0.0037** 0.0021 -0.0018 0.002 1.51 
Voluntary   -0.0241 0.0232 3.14 
Refund   -0.0558*** 0.0214 1.37 
Recency   0.0016* 0.0011 5.07 
PostDieselgate   -0.0568** 0.0314 2.22 
      
F 1.739  7.97   
Significance .1763  .000   
R2 .1266  .6355   
Significant levels (one-tailed tests): * 10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level 
The variance inflation factors (VIF) are all below 10.0, providing evidence of low 
multicollinearity (Hair et al. 2014). Model 1 includes the three control variables (firm-fixed 
effects, the presence of a recall, and the firm size). The variables used to test the hypotheses of 
interest were added to generate Model 2, which can be used to investigate whether they added 
significantly to the abnormal returns. With an R2 of 17.63% in Model 1, on their own, recalls 
and firm size (revenues) were unable to explain any variance in the abnormal returns. By adding 
further explanatory variables in Model 2, the R2 increased substantially to 63.55%, indicating 
this model is accurate in explaining the variation in the abnormal returns observed on Day 0 of 
an environmental failure announcement. 
Model 2 provides some support for our hypothesised relationships. The hypothesis 
relating to the voluntary standards is not significant. The remaining hypotheses are significant 
with compensation statistically significant at the 1% level, the recency of the events is 
significant at the 10% level, and the occurrence following Dieselgate is statistically significant 
at the 5% level.  
While we had predicted that failure to reach a voluntary standard would be more 
negative, there is no evidence to support this. As predicted, the estimated coefficient relating 
to the breach of a voluntary standards is negative but the robust standard error is large and, 
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therefore, we cannot say conclusively whether a difference existed when the standard breached 
has been voluntarily set. 
The estimated coefficient for the indicator variable that a refund was used as a remedy 
is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in a one-tailed test. The result indicates 
that there is an additional penalty on the firm if they elect to compensate customers with a 
refund. A key implication of our results is that firms pay a higher price if they use refunds. The 
negative economic impact should encourage firms to examine other options that may rectify 
the situation without the adverse impacts.  
While we predicted that the coefficient relating to the recency of the event would be 
positive, the estimated coefficient was only marginally positive and significantly different from 
zero at the 10% level in a one-tailed test. This result indicates a very weak pattern whereby 
more recently occurring events are less economically damaging to the firms. The coefficient is 
also of a smaller magnitude than the others, indicating a weak and small effect. 
In contrast, the estimated coefficient relating to events occurring post-Dieselgate was 
negative, as predicted, and significantly different to zero at the 5% level in a one-tailed test. 
This result indicates that the added scrutiny on firms, their behaviours, and failures in the post-
Dieselgate economy has led to a sharper stock market reaction to failures for the eight events 
in our sample following Diselgate. A key implication is that managers should increasingly pay 
attention to the implications of failing to meet the environmental standards in the contemporary 
era.  
In the case of the control variables, the coefficients for firm size and the presence of 
recalls are insignificantly different to zero. While the coefficient relating to recalls is 
insignificantly different from zero, it is positive. This result may indicate that a recall in 
conjunction with the announced environmental failures is perceived as being marginally 
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positive, perhaps indicating that the firm is prepared to take more substantive action to remedy 
the problem. 
Table 4. Results of the hypothesis testing. 
 
Hypothesis Predicted 
direction 
Result 
HYPOTHESIS 1. The announcements of failures to meet environmental 
standards will have a negative stock market reaction. - -1.01%
a
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: The stock market reaction to announcements of failures to 
meet voluntary fuel standards will be more negative than failure to meet 
mandated standards 
- 
Not 
significant 
HYPOTHESIS 3: The stock market reaction to offers of refunds will be 
more negative than for other remedies. - -0.0558*** 
HYPOTHESIS 4: The stock market reaction to recent announcements of 
failures to meet environmental standards will be less negative than for older 
announcements. 
+ 0.0016* 
HYPOTHESIS 5: The stock market reaction to announcements of failures to 
meet environmental standards after Dieselgate will be more negative than 
other announcements. 
- 
-0.0568** 
Significant levels (one-tailed tests): * 10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level 
Significant levels (two-tailed test for the abnormal return): a 1% level 
 
The results (Table 4) indicate that while Dieselgate has grabbed headlines, this category 
of failure is consistently considered negative by the stock market. Therefore, while Dieselgate 
resulted in a loss of stockholder wealth for VW (Mansouri 2016), this category of event is also 
negative for other automotive firms. Our results are broadly consistent with the findings of 
Nunes and Park (2016), which documented that the impact of the Dieselgate was contagious to 
other U.S. automotive sector firms (the competitors). Similarly, we find a temporal effect, 
insofar as while Dieselgate increased immediate suspicion of the other firms, the negative 
abnormal returns post-Dieselgate also increased in magnitude. 
Our finding relating to the fuel standards is that identified breaches of fuel standards 
lead to more negative abnormal returns. In some ways, this contrasts with the theoretical 
perspective where we might expect substantive efforts made by the firms to reach voluntary 
targets to be more significant. When we consider the operational performance of the firms and 
fuel standards as an order qualifier instead, the failure to attain this standard is clearly 
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strategically problematic for the companies involved as it may lead to direct penalties or 
removal from the market; in contrast, failure to hit a voluntary target leaves them in the market.  
 
Implications 
The finding of a negative stock market reaction to failing to meet environmental standards 
matches the hypothesised direction. The strength of the reaction is also worth noting – Table 5 
indicates that it is greater than the stock market reaction to several types of recalls or even 
labour abuse announcements, a social issue rather than environmental (Daly, Pouder, and 
McNeil 2017). This research highlights the significant costs of disruption caused by the 
announced failure to meet standards. 
Table 5. Event study results of this study relative to similar studies. 
 
Study Disruption and sector Event window Stock market 
reaction 
This research Environmental standards in the 
automotive sector 
Event day -1.01% *** 
Rupp (2001) Safety recalls in the automotive 
sector 
(-1, 0) -0.28% ** 
Thirumalai and 
Sinha (2011) 
Safety recalls in the medical devices 
sector 
(-1,0) -0.26% ns 
Chen et al. (2009) Product recalls (proactive strategy), 
consumer products 
Event day -0.59% ** 
Thomsen and 
McKenzie (2001) 
Safety recalls, meat and poultry 
sector 
Event day -0.4% * 
Zhao et al. (2013) Product recalls in China 
(pharmaceuticals, automobile, food, 
electronics) 
Event day -0.31% ns 
Daly et al. (2017) Labour standards  Event day -0.24% ** 
Significance levels: ns not significant, * 10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level 
Notes: These may not reflect the main results reported in each article – we have used data provided in the articles to isolate values closest to the event-day window that we used in the 
present article. 
 
Our first finding is that when the firm is told to compensate consumers for the failure 
in the announcement, the abnormal returns are more negative. This finding suggests that when 
compensation is involved, investors perceive that the costs of the failure will be greater to the 
firm. This finding is important for businesses to note, as it highlights the fact that providing 
compensation may not be the best way to remedy an environmental failure (financially, in any 
case). We recommend that other forms of compensation such as extended warranties or free 
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repairs may be a more viable option. If monetary compensation is most practical, another 
suggestion could be to avoid mention of compensation in the initial failure announcement, and 
instead notify consumers privately to not concern shareholders. This finding relates to the 
observation of Chen et al. (2009), who stated that when firms proactively manage product 
recalls, investors infer that the crisis is severe and the firm has to reduce potential financial 
loss. This suggests that firms should communicate effectively to investors about the rationale 
for the action. 
Secondly, the significance of abnormal returns being more negative after the VW 
scandal suggests that public scrutiny of automotive firms failing environmental standards has 
largely increased after this event. Due to the large losses VW faced in the wake of cheating 
their emissions tests (Mansouri 2016), subsequent environmental violations saw shareholders 
react with increased alarm at potentially similar disastrous losses. In a post-Dieselgate world, 
automotive firms should, therefore, be increasingly concerned with maintaining their 
environmental standards, and ensuring that they are meeting the required environmental 
regulations.  
According to marketing theory, consumers are not always capable of selecting good 
products for themselves (Abela and Murphy 2008). They make their decisions based on 
advertisements. In a post-Dieselgate world, they are more sensitive about the failure to meet 
environmental standards. This increasingly negative impact of adverse events occurring post-
Dieselgate could be transferable to other industries, and the negative impact on abnormal 
returns could exist for other types of failures. Thus, after an industry experiences a major shock 
event, like Dieselgate, investors could become increasingly sensitive to any similar 
reoccurrences, even if they are not on the same scale. Further research would be required to 
ascertain the existence of this phenomenon.  
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Our findings overall suggest that firms are punished by the market when they publicly 
announce a failure to achieve certain environmental standards. We hope that these findings 
serve as a deterrent to those firms who try to get away with minimal compliance, those which 
benefit from inflated environmental performance claims that differ from reality, and those 
which try to evade the legal environmental requirements completely, as in the case of VW.  
While these results are derived from the automotive sector, this is merely a context for 
the study. Similar early studies in product-harm literature also focused on automotive recalls 
(Haunschild and Rhee 2004; Rupp 2001), and yet the results have been broadly similar to other 
product recalls. As a result, we assume that the results would be generalisable to other sectors 
as well. Some of the key results indicate that managers should take care following major events 
and monitor to ensure that their firms will not fall foul; our results indicate that investors have 
become increasingly risk-averse following the Dieselgate scandal, with following cases 
experiencing a more severe stock market reaction. Similarly, if there is a major event in another 
sector, competitors should monitor their performance following the event as the further failures 
will be treated more severely afterward. 
Asserting environmental performance will continue to be important as marketers focus 
on the rise of sustainable consumption, which is defined as consuming for present needs in a 
way that does not compromise future needs (Cherrier, Szuba, and Özçalar-Toulouse 2012). 
In promoting sustainable consumption, marketers encourage the development and use of 
technological innovation and offer green products to consumers (McDonagh and Prothero 
2014). Following this critical perspective, researchers have studied the effects of the ecosystem. 
For example, Cherrier et al. (2012) explored the constraining forces to reduce greenhouse-gas 
emissions via sustainable consumption. The results show that there is an awareness of gas 
emissions and social pressure is important for reducing gas emissions. Konar and Cohen (2001) 
reported that a 10% reduction in emissions of toxic chemicals increased the market value of 
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studied firms by US $34m. These studies highlight the relationship between emissions and firm 
performance and infer that marketers should pay attention to sustainability, environmental 
performance, or emissions as mechanisms that can propel firm performance upwards. 
Nkamnebe (2011) highlighted the importance of sustainability marketing in fostering 
sustainable consumption, which increases customer value, social value, and ecological value, 
and identified challenges in its adoption. In this context, marketing ethics is an important 
consideration for marketers. Marketers should communicate ethically about the 
environmentally harmful products to consumers (Nill and Schibrowsky 2007), and be 
responsible for the marketing of products that advance well-being (Ferrell and Ferrell 2008). 
Our results show that failing to reach environmental standards has a similar outcome 
for the firms involved as failing to reach a safety standard. Strong negative stock market 
reactions to the announcements show feedback at a societal level and the macromarketing 
consequences of the failure; from a macromarketing perspective, the problem of deception and 
ethics is an important one. The stock market reaction to the failures that we have reported on 
is significantly greater than, say, a regulatory penalty of US$1m as levied against 
DaimlerChrysler (US EPA 2005). This strong stock market reaction demonstrates the severity 
of the long-term consequences to society of such behaviours, as perceived by stock market 
investors. 
Conclusions 
Based on our analysis of 41 announcements made by publicly traded automotive firms from 
1984-2016, we have documented that the announcements are associated with a statistically 
significant negative stock market reaction. Using a single-day event window, the mean stock 
market reaction is -1.02% and the percent of cases experiencing a negative reaction is 61%. 
We find that more recent announcements resulted in a less negative stock market reaction than 
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early announcements; however, a failure to meet fuel standards, the announcement occurring 
after Dieselgate, and the offering of compensation as a remedy, are all associated with a more 
negative stock market reaction. 
These findings are important as they indicate that announcements about firms failing to 
meet environmental standards in the automotive industry do have a negative impact on stock 
returns on the day of the announcements. This finding is of interest to macromarketers as it 
shows the consequences to firms of misleading marketing practices where there are claims of 
environmental performance that are not met. Investors appear to have an adverse reaction to 
such announcements, possibly in the expectation that firms will subsequently incur large costs 
in remedying the publicised failure. These results provide evidence that these failures are 
monitored closely and can be more significant following a bellwether event, such as VW’s 
Dieselgate scandal. Our results also indicate that while the Dieselgate episode was a major 
event, this category of event is also important and can result in a meaningful adverse stock 
market reaction. 
The findings document that the stock market reactions to environmental failures can be 
large. Surprisingly, the Dieselgate scandal revealed an organisational behaviour of firms using 
marketing systems to take advantage of self-imposed or controlled regulations to not only 
deceive customers but that they willingly choose their course of action while knowing of the 
possible negative implications. Such deceptive organisational behaviours are common, as we 
demonstrate in this research; however, we also demonstrate that the stock market reaction 
reflects a strong belief that there are severe long-term consequences of such behaviours. This 
outcome may influence future marketing behaviour. The behaviours of managers can have a 
much wider impact and change the overall marketing system that they operate within. The 
German government, despite their involvement in the Dieselgate scandal, worked to protect 
the market, the German brand, and attempted to restore the civic trust that government 
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decisions are made to benefit society. They used the failure and deception of the automotive 
industry for two ends. First, they updated the government-regulated quality assurance process. 
Second, they also reminded the industry about their social responsibility, enforced research, 
and innovation by outlawing their products within city limits.  
Laczniak and Murphy (2006) stated that the quality of the ethical analysis is influenced 
by the moral thinking of managers and ethical standards. As more stakeholder groups are 
evaluated, the higher the likelihood of perceiving possible negative outcomes that require 
further investigation by a firm. In the case of VW, recognise any potential negative outcome 
for all stakeholders would be challenging due to the many stakeholders involved in the 
evaluation process, and, therefore, a greater challenge to discover unethical issues. As 
suggested by the comments made by the Toyota President (Reuters 2010), employee capability 
may be difficult to maintain in periods of rapid growth. Firms should carefully consider ethical 
behaviours that may impact society, as Laczniak and Murphy (2006) suggested that marketers 
should take responsibility for the end of a marketing campaign. In the case of VW, while 
marketers may not know of the institutional decision to deceive, they should, however, take 
responsibility for the outcomes and focus on both the methods and outcomes of the marketing 
campaigns, even where the negative outcomes were the result of an institutional intention to 
deceive. These outcomes suggest that, given the magnitude of the stock market reaction, there 
is a strong onus on marketing managers to be aware of activities within the firm that may lead 
to negative societal outcomes and, from this, a negative stock market reaction when the public 
is informed of the outcomes. 
The research results are of interest to macromarketers as they show the stock market 
reaction to misleading marketing and failing environmental standards can be severe, addressing 
the question of how consequences of this lapse in marketing ethics can be measured 
(Mittelstaedt, Kilbourne, and Mittelstaedt 2006). The stock market reaction to the 
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environmental standard failures studied is similar to the negative reaction to safety standard 
failures and provides an important feedback loop for firms as they work to develop a stronger 
sustainable market orientation (Mitchell, Wooliscroft, and Higham 2010). The immediate stock 
market reaction may prove to be a stronger feedback mechanism than regulatory penalties; 
therefore, such a negative stock market reaction may help firms to develop an orientation that 
provides improved societal outcomes with products that deliver the environmental performance 
promised. These results suggest that marketing system behaviours should adapt to develop and 
market products that meet the promised environment standards. 
We have identified three directions for future research. First, it could be valuable to 
examine in more detail whether there are different drivers for the failures and examine whether 
the abnormal return varies by these different drivers. Second, the interaction between recalls 
and failures may require additional exploration as our estimated coefficient for the use of 
recalls was positive although not significantly different to zero. Third, our research examined 
the financial performance of the firm in response to failures to reach standards and leaves aside 
the question of whether a firm striving to reach more stringent voluntary standards will gain 
operational performance benefits and whether these failures to reach voluntarily standards have 
operational performance consequences. 
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